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COMMENTARY
THE HEALTH CARE COOPERATION ACT:
PANACEA OR PERIL?
Natalma M. McKnew"
Sandra L. W. Miller"
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a time of unprecedented change in the health care industry.
Pressure from consumers to reduce health care costs, the increasing power of
health care insurers and hospitals (and the resulting price squeeze on health
care providers), and even President Clinton's failed efforts to address health
care issues have fueled the fires of change. In a near panic, physicians are
banding together in independent practice associations (IPAs), preferred
provider organizations (PPOs), and other alliances.
The federal antitrust laws' hang over these efforts like the Sword of
Damocles, a potential threat to every combination that could be seen to reduce
competition or increase concentration in any segment of the provider market.
The recent efforts of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission to describe "safe harbors" in which such alliances will not attract
regulatory attention,2 while helpful, do not satisfy the needs of the health care
industry-particularly physicians-for predictability.
* Ms. McKnew is the managing director and a shareholder in Leatherwood Walker Todd &
Mann, P.C., Greenville, S.C., and concentrates her practice in antitrust and trade regulation
litigation and counseling.
** Ms. Miller is a shareholder in Leatherwood Walker Todd & Mann, P.C., and concentrates
her practice in health care law. The authors wish to thank Leon B. Frishman for his willingness
to discuss newly promulgated Regulation 61-31 and Scarlett Spence, who assisted in the
preparation of this article.
1. The Sherman Act, the central federal antitrust statute, declares it unlawful to combine,
contract, or conspire "in restraint of trade or commerce" or to "monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce" of the states. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988).
2. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA (1993),
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,150, revised, Sept. 27, 1994 [hereinafter DOJ/FTC
Policy Statements].
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Unable to achieve predictability, providers have sought the assistance of
state legislatures to escape the ambit of federal antitrust laws.3 These efforts
led to enactment of the South Carolina Health Care Cooperation Act in 1994.4
The Health Care Cooperation Act attempts to create an exemption from
state and federal antitrust statutes for certain cooperative agreements within the
health care industry. If (and only if) properly administered, this exemption
will remove state-supervised restraints on competition in the health care
industry from the reach of a Sherman Act challenge.
The Health Care Cooperation Act will create an effective state action
exemption if it is properly written and fully implemented by the state.
However, it will not shield the health care providers from liability if the state
fails to maintain an active role.5 In addition, one provision of the statute
clearly will fail to provide immunity from the antitrust laws. Section 44-7-
520(B) allegedly shields from antitrust scrutiny "conduct in negotiating and
entering into a cooperative agreement."6 This provision is not only mislead-
ing, it is potentially dangerous. Because the state is not involved in the
prefiling negotiation stage, there can be no state action immunity for activities
during that stage. Negotiating activities per se will remain fully exposed to
antitrust claims. Health care providers involved in negotiations are well
advised to act cautiously, to document discussions, and to involve an attorney
to avoid liability problems. Ensuring that inappropriate topics are avoided
during these initial stages is crucial.
II. THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
The state action exemption originated in a 1943 United States Supreme
Court decision, Parker v. Brown.7 In that case, the Court held that, because
of principles of federalism and state sovereignty, a state sponsored market-
sharing scheme was immune from antitrust attack.8 It reasoned that the
purpose of the Sherman Act was to prohibit private restraints on trade, not to
prohibit anticompetitive acts prescribed by the states "as an act of govern-
3. At least 21 states have enacted statutes designed to exempt cooperative arrangements in
the health care industry from state and federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 20-1051 to -1068 (1990 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-72.1 (Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 65-472 (1992); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 1881-1888 (West Supp. 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.44.450 (Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 150.85 (West Supp.
1995); WYo. ST. § 35-24-101 to -116 (Supp. 1995). See also Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for
State-SanctionedProvider CollaborationAfter Ticor, 62 ANTrrIUST L.J. 409 (1994) (comparing
recently enacted legislation for provider immunity).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-500 to -590 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995)
5. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2176-77 (1992).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-520(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
7. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
8. Id. at 350-52.
[Vol. 47:615
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ment. " 9 Thus, states are lawfully permitted to establish regulatory programs
that may adversely affect competition, without exposing the participants to
antitrust liability. Parker essentially allows a state government artificially to
impair competition despite the free competition policies implicit in the federal
antitrust statutes. 10
Since enunciating the doctrine, the Court has refined and narrowed the
state action exemption. A two-prong test for state action immunity was
described in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass' v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc.1 Before state-sponsored anticompetitive activities are shielded from
antitrust liability, according to the Court, two requirements must be fulfilled:
(1) the state must articulate a clear and affirmative policy to allow the
anticompetitive conduct, and (2) the state must actively supervise the
conduct. 2 In other words, the state must clearly express and authorize a
policy to displace competition with regulation. Only activities that further
state regulatory policies are protected by this doctrine. For this reason, the
state must clearly express its intent to depart from the ordinary market
principles underlying the Sherman Act.3
9. Id. at 352. In a later case, the Court held that Parker immunity also shields private parties
from antitrust liability. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 61-62 (1985).
10. The courts have long held that freedom from price fixing and cartels is essential to the
preservation of a free market system. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,
610 (1972) (explaining that the Sherman Act is "as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms").
11. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
12. Id. at 105.
13. Later cases further refined the Parker immunity doctrine. For example, conduct by the
state (rather than that delegated to an agency) is not held to as strict a standard under the state
exemption doctrine. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (exempting anticompetitive
conduct performed by the state from antitrust liability regardless of the state's motives).
Municipalities are also granted some leniency in the burden of proof because they are considered
to be arms of the state and are presumed to act in the public interest. See Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (granting state action immunity to municipal restriction of
competition without applying the second prong of Midcal when the municipality was implement-
ing a clearly articulated state policy). However, the courts have held nonmunicipal parties to a
higher standard and have applied both prongs of the Midcal test. See Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc., 471 U.S. 48 (requiring collective ratemakers to satisfy both prongs of
Midcal in order for anticompetitive conduct to be immune from Sherman Act liability).
However, "the State's failure to describe the implementation of its policy in detail will not subject
the program to the restraints of the federal antitrust laws," so long as the state's intent to establish
an anticompetitive regulatory program is clear. Id. at 65. See also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy,
479 U.S. 335 (1987) (displacing competition among liquor retailers without substituting an
adequate system of regulation will not support a state action exemption); Lancaster Community
Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "mere
statutory authorization to engage in business will not be so readily viewed as a displacement of
3
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The second prong of Midcal was not closely scrutinized until 1988, when
the Court more sharply defined the active supervision requirement in Patrick
v. Burget.14 The Court in Patrick recognized that private parties engage in
anticompetitive activity primarily to further their own interests, not those of
the state. In order to ensure that anticompetitive acts of a private party
actually further state regulatory policies, the Court held that the state must
"exercise ultimate control" over the challenged conduct. 5  Only if state
officials have the power to review the challenged anticompetitive activity can
there be any assurance that the conduct in fact furthers state, rather than
private, interests. In order to satisfy the second prong of the Midcal test,
therefore, the state must have and exercise such power.1
6
Prior to its 1992 decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title
Insurance Co.,"7 the Supreme Court had not defined the precise level of state
activity required to trigger the exemption. In Ticor, the Court finally
attempted to describe "how much activity is enough." The questionable
conduct in Ticor involved horizontal fee-setting by six title insurance
companies.' 8  The Ticor decision reaffirmed that the active supervision test
is not met simply because a state agency is empowered and required to
regulate activity pursuant to a declared state policy.' 9 Instead, the state must
actually play a substantial role in supervising the activity.2" Unfortunately,
the Court did not adequately define the meaning of "substantial role." Some
competition").
14. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
15. Id. at 101.
16. See id. at 102-03 (explaining that a general supervisory power does not constitute active
supervision).
17. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992). In its decision, the Court assumed that Parker immunity applies
to the Federal Trade Commission Act in the same way it applies to the Sherman Act. Id. at
2177-78.
18. Id. at 2172. See also Jeffery M. Cross & Patrick J. Ahem, FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance:
Supreme Court Puts StateAction Immunity Under the Lens, ANTITRUST, Fall/Winter 1992, at 24.
19. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2176-78. Health care providers should be very
concerned about this reaffirmation and its potential effect on activity under the Health Care
Cooperation Act. However, it should be noted that the states involved in the Ticor decision filed
amicus briefs, admitting they had not actively supervised the anticompetitive conduct at issue.
See id. at 2178. Undoubtedly, these briefs played a significant role in persuading the Court to
deny state action immunity to the title companies' conduct.
20. See id. at 2177. Lower courts have applied this requirement to private parties only. See
Askew v. DCH Regional Health Care Auth., 995 F.2d 1033, 1038 (1lth Cir. 1993) (stating that
Ticor is not applicable to political subdivisions of the state); Porter Testing Lab. v. Board of
Regents, 993 F.2d 768, 772 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that "dicta in later Supreme Court cases
imply that the active supervision requirement of the Midcal test applies only to private parties");
Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 980 F.2d 1381, 1385-87 (11th Cir. 1993) (declaring that
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scholars have interpreted Ticor to mean that a defendant "can claim the Parker
exemption only by showing that the practice at issue was brought to the
attention of the regulatory agency, that the agency considered the practice with
the requisite degree of attention, and then approved it."21 Although this may
be an accurate reading of Ticor, it gives little guidance as to the required level
of state attention. States that intend statutorily to create a Parker exemption
are left to muddle in the dusk.
It would be difficult for any state to establish and implement an assuredly
exempt regulatory program based on the current state of the law. Recent
opinions focus on what is not active supervision, rather than defining the level
of state involvement necessary to establish Parker immunity for private parties.
In Patrick, for instance, the Court found insufficient state supervision to confer
immunity in a hospital peer review system with the following powers reserved
to the state: general supervisory powers over matters relating to health; a
statutory obligation to establish and review procedures; the power to initiate
judicial proceedings; and the power to deny, suspend, or revoke hospital
license for failure to comply with statutory requirements.22 The Court
criticized the state agency's inability to review program quality, but otherwise
was not overly helpful.
Divining the level of state activity that will satisfy the active supervision
requirement remains difficult even after Ticor. Rather than defining a
normative standard, the Court instead preached the importance of active state
supervision (without suggesting how a state could meet this standard).'
Despite this lack of guidance, a few things are relatively clear after Ticor.
It is now clear that to satisfy the active supervision requirement, a
defendant must show not only the existence of a state regulatory program in
which a state agency has the authority to regulate the anticompetitive conduct,
but also evidence that such authority has been exercised.' A state regulatory
program that simply rubber-stamps the conduct of a private party is not
21. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAmP, ANTITRUST LAW 212.7b, at 220 (Supp.
1995).
22. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102.
23. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2176-77.
24. See, e.g., Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 804 F. Supp. 700,
712 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (recognizing state action immunity where the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission "devised a detailed scheme for the evaluation and supervision of electric utility load
management programs[,]... is sensitive to potential anticompetitive impacts, [and] is continually
refining this scheme to make clearer programs that further the state policy").
1996]
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sufficient.' Under Ticor's concept of the supervision prong, the state itself,
rather than the private party, must be the effective decision-maker. 26
Ticor clearly disfavors what is known as a negative option scheme. 27
Under such a scheme, rates set by private parties are filed with a state agency
and become effective unless the agency affirmatively rejects the rates within
a certain period of time. The state agency clearly lacks active supervisory
power in a negative option scheme. Because the state maintains no involve-
ment in establishing or monitoring the rates, it cannot exercise "ultimate
control" over the anticompetitive conduct. 2' Furthermore, should the state
agency fail to respond within the set time period, the rates become effective,
whether an agency official has reviewed the conduct or not. The fact that the
state theoretically has the authority to reject a rate plan will not support Parker
immunity. Clearly, the state must be more deeply involved.
Antitrust jurisprudence embraces the presumption that private parties
acting in an anticompetitive manner are doing so out of concern for their own
interests.29 Therefore, a state regulatory scheme will not satisfy Ticor unless
it includes mechanisms by which the state can ensure that a private party's
anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy. The Court in Ticor thus
observed that the purpose of the active supervision requirement is to ensure
that "the State has exercised sufficient independent judgment and control" over
the anticompetitive conduct and to ensure that such conduct is the "product of
deliberate state intervention. "30 Under this analysis, courts should not be
concerned with whether a state regulation functions efficiently or is the optimal
economic choice. Rather, the inquiry should be "whether the anticompetitive
scheme is the state's own. "31
The Ticor Court's reliance on Parker suggests that the active supervision
requirement should be applied to a wide range of anticompetitive behavior.
However, the majority also used language that could be read to limit Ticor's
application. For example, the Court cautioned that its "decision should be
read in light of the gravity of the antitrust offense [price fixing], the involve-
ment of private actors throughout, and the clear absence of state supervi-
sion. "32 It warned that price fixing is the most "pernicious" antitrust offense,
25. Ticor Title Ins. Co, 112 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (stating that "[a]ctual state involvement, not
deference to private price fixing arrangements ... is the precondition for immunity from federal
law").
26. Id.
27. See id. at 2179.
28. See Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01.
29. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47 (noting that "[w]here a private party is engaging in the
anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests").
30. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2177.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2180.
[Vol. 47:615
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perhaps suggesting that the required level of state activity might be less with
other types of anticompetitive conduct.33 It would be foolish to assume,
however, that the active supervision test could be ignored, regardless of the
type of conduct at issue.
The Ticor Court's unsurprising failure to establish strict rules regarding
the active supervision requirement makes the opinion particularly dangerous
to the health care industry in this era of rapid change. As Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed, the majority gave no rational guidance to regulated
private parties who wish to rely on Parker immunity. 4 As a result, whether
health care industry participants in South Carolina will actually achieve the
immunity promised by the Health Care Cooperation Act will remain in
question until the statute and regulations are analyzed by state and federal
courts. This uncertainty may discourage some health care providers from
pursuing cooperative agreements. The more likely result is that industry
participants-and their attorneys-will be forced to monitor and even
encourage active state participation as a security measure against antitrust
liability. 35 Ironically, if the Health Care Cooperation Act is to provide
immunity, the objects of its regulation must be certain that the state is
watching and acting.
HI. THE HEALTH CARE COOPERATION ACT
The South Carolina Health Care Cooperation Act is designed to provide
immunity from federal and state antitrust laws to health care providers who
participate in state-supervised cooperative arrangements.36 Cooperative
33. See id.
34. Id. at 2182 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. For a discussion of the impact Ticor may have on motions to dismiss and requests for
summary judgment, see Cross & Ahern, supra note 18.
36. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-520(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (stating that "[i]t is the
intent of this article to require the State to provide direction, supervision, regulation, and control
over approved cooperative agreements .... [in order to] provide immunity ... from civil
liability and criminal prosecution under federal or state antitrust laws"). The attempt to create
state action immunity resulted from the General Assembly's findings:
(1) that the cost of improved health technology and scientific methods contributes
significantly to the increasing cost of health care;
(2) that cooperative agreements among hospitals[,] health care purchasers, and
other health care providers would foster improvements in the quality of health care
for South Carolinians, moderate cost increases, improve access to needed services in
rural areas, and enhance the likelihood that rural hospitals can remain open;
(3) that federal and state antitrust laws may prohibit or discourage cooperative
agreements that are beneficial to South Carolinians and that such agreements should
be encouraged; and
(4) that competition as currently mandated by federal and state antitrust laws
should be supplemented by a regulatory program to permit and encourage cooperative
19961
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agreements are defined by the Act as those created for the "sharing, allocation,
and referral" of patients, programs, facilities (including support, medical,
diagnostic, or laboratory), procedures, and equipment or the acquisition or
merger of assets.3 7 The Act purports to create a mechanism by which certain
cooperative activities among competitors in the health care field might achieve
immunity from antitrust scrutiny. In order to effectively provide this
immunity, however, the Act must meet both prongs of Midcal, as modified by
the recent Ticor decision.
The first prong of the Midcal test is clearly satisfied. Section 44-7-505(4)
specifically states that health care "competition. . .should be supplanted by
a regulatory program" in South Carolina.38 The legislature has thus stated
that, in an effort to improve the quality of health care available to South
Carolinians, the state will permit certain collaborative arrangements, even
though these agreements might otherwise be considered anticompetitive.39
This provision articulates the clear intention of the South Carolina legislature
to displace competition with regulation, as required by the first prong of
Midcal.
40
The Act's satisfaction of the second prong of Midcal is less clear. Patrick
and Ticor significantly narrowed the definition of active supervision. 41
Although the Act may sufficiently empower state officials, it is not clear
whether that power will be exercised consistently with Ticor to create Parker
immunity.
The Act directs the Department of Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC) to evaluate and issue Certificates of Public Advantage for qualifying
cooperative health care arrangements.42 Cooperative arrangements eligible
agreements between [sic] hospitals, health care purchasers, or other health care
providers when the benefits outweigh the disadvantages caused by their potential
adverse effects on competition.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-505 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-510(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). These are the same types of
activities that are addressed in DOJ/FTC Policy Statements, supra note 2.
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-505(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-505(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). See also supra note 36.
40. See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 39-46 (1985) (explaining and
applying the first prong of the Midcal test); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (stating that the first prong of the state action
immunity test is that "the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy'").
41. The Patrick Court refined the meaning of active state supervision by concluding that "state
officials [must] have and exercise power to review" anticompetitive activity. Patrick v. Burget,
486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (emphasis added). Not until Ticor did the Court address the sufficiency
of a state regulatory program that gave state officials the power to review private party conduct.
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-540 to -550 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
[Vol. 47:615
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for certification under the Act include IPAs, PPOs, mergers, equipment and
facility cooperatives, and other network or joint venture activities.43 The
statute directs DHEC to issue a certificate if the likely benefits from the
agreement outweigh the likely disadvantages, and if the resulting reduction in
competition is reasonably necessary to obtain the likely benefits."
Adequate empowerment becomes questionable only in South Carolina
Code section 44-7-550, which establishes a negative option alternative to truly
active state supervision. That provision can be read to provide for automatic
approval by DHEC if the Attorney General fails to act on an application within
thirty days. State action immunity for the negative option, which was
specifically disapproved in Ticor,45 may seriously threaten any immunity
supposedly conferred by the Act. Because there are clearly expressed
standards for approval and an opportunity for DHEC to act, the theoretical
negative option need not be fatal. Evidence of active evaluation, approval,
and disapproval by DHEC, together with appropriate regulations and an
absence of arrangements that become effective through the negative option,
may overcome the statutory taint.46 In order for cooperative arrangements
to be shielded from antitrust challenge, DHEC must actively approve,
disapprove, and monitor the agreements. Ideally, this would include rejecting
some requests for certificates.47 If the state regulatory mechanism becomes
lethargic, however, the risk to health care industry participants increases, and
the cloak of immunity may suddenly disappear.
The success of the Act depends largely upon DHEC and the state
legislature. Although the precise degree of state activity needed to comply
with Parker and Ticor is unclear, DHEC must maintain an active presence.
The South Carolina Legislature has taken the first step to protect the health
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-510(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). Price fixing and predatory
pricing are specifically excluded from eligibility.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-560(1), (2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). The statute lists nine
possible advantages of cooperative agreements that DHEC should consider, including increased
cost efficiency, improved access to health care services, enhanced health care services to
medicaid and indigent patients, and the avoidance or reduction of duplicated resources. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-7-560(1)(a)(i)-(ix) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). The inability of health care
purchasers to negotiate optimal payment and service arrangements with health care providers, the
reduction in competition, and the adverse impact on patients in the quality and price of services
available are among the likely disadvantages DHEC is to consider and weigh. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-7-560(1)(b)(i)-(v) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
45. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2178 (1992).
46. See id. at 2177 (stating that the purpose of the active supervision inquiry "is to determine
whether the state has exercised sufficient independent judgment and control so that the
[anticompetitive conduct has] been established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not
simply by agreement among private parties").
47. By rejecting some requests, the regulatory agency demonstrates active control over the
anticompetitive conduct, rather than merely rubber-stamping participants' anticompetitive
schemes. See, e.g., Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (noting that "[t]he active supervisionprong of the
Midcal test requires that state officials have and exercise power to review particular anti-
competitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail .... Absent such a program
of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct
promotes state policy . . ").
1996]
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care field from liability, but only a fully staffed and fully funded program will
properly immunize purchasers and providers.
IV. REGULATION 61-31
DHEC approved Regulation 61-31, pertaining to health care cooperative
agreements, on December 8, 1994, and the Regulation became effective June
23, 1995.48 The Regulations describe an active supervisory role for the state.
An application for a Certificate of Public Advantage must be filed with
DHEC,49 which will review the application to determine whether it is
complete.5" When DHEC determines that the application is complete, DHEC
must forward a copy to the Attorney General's Office.5' The Attorney
General "may advise" DHEC in writing "to approve or deny the applica-
tion."52 Failure of the Attorney General to act within thirty days constitutes
a recommendation of approval to DHEC.
53
The Attorney General's required review tracks S.C. Code section 44-7-
550(A), the only part of the Health Care Cooperation Act where compliance
with Midcal becomes questionable. The regulation is ambiguous, providing
that the Attorney General's failure to act within thirty days "constitutes a
recommendation for approval of the request." This could be read as a
negative option, resulting in automatic approval without sufficient statutory
review.
The statute does not resolve the ambiguity. S.C. Code section 44-7-
550(B) requires DHEC to issue an order "approving or denying the application
for a Certificate of Public Advantage" upon receipt of the Attorney General's
advice or (presumably if the Attorney General fails to act) "at the end of the
review period outlined in [s]ection 44-7-540." Whether DHEC makes an
independent decision, or is instead required to follow the Attorney General's
advice, is dangerously unclear. Were this the final expression of state
authority, the negative option would likely taint the entire regulatory system.
However, Regulation 61-31, section 305 resolves the ambiguity in favor of
active state regulation: "The Attorney General's opinion is advisory and
DHEC is responsible for rendering the final decision."
There is no negative option in DHEC's responsibilities under the
Regulations. Section 307 of Regulation 6.1-63 requires DHEC to consider the
record before it (including any opinion from the Attorney General), the
application, input from affected persons, relevant data, literature, and other
48. Regulation61-31, drafted by Leon Frishman, was discussed in depth at the Eighth Annual
Health Care Law Seminar, sponsored by the South Carolina Bar CLE Division on September 22,
1995. Mr. Frishman's Regulations are well-drafted, but he expressed some of the same concerns
that are expressed by the authors of this article.
49. S.C. CODE REGS. 61-31 § 301 (Supp. 1995).
50. S.C. CODE REGS. 61-31 § 302 (Supp. 1995).
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information.54 The Department's decision must be in writing and must "set
forth the basis for the decision." An affected person may undertake an
administrative appeal, and DHEC's decision is not final until the appellate
process is complete. 5 Thus, it appears that the Regulations provide DHEC
with sufficient authority to supervise actively the process of granting
Certificates of Public Advantage.
Initial supervision, however, is not enough. Active state supervision
requires some involvement in monitoring the continued favorable status of the
arrangement. The Regulations once again direct such supervision. Review is
two-fold: first, DHEC is required to "actively monitor" the arrangement and
"may request" additional information at will; second, parties to the arrange-
ment must file an activities report with DHEC every two years after a
certificate is granted.56 In fact, the Regulations do not stop with the mere
filing of a biennial report. DHEC is required affirmatively to determine
"whether the cooperative agreement continues to comply with the terms of the
Certificate of Public Advantage."57 DHEC's monitoring activities, however,
are not as well-defined as the initial granting activities. Thus, although the
Regulations mandate review of the activities report by DHEC at least every
two years, there are no requirements of publication, notification of affected
persons, or the like, except when a certificate is revoked.5" Although this
creates some small risk, the risk does not appear significant in light of the
extensive review at the initial certificate stage.
Of far more concern to the practical effect of creating a state action
exemption are (1) the paucity of data required in initial support of the
application, (2) the lack of funding for operation of the program, and (3) the
lack of personnel to enforce the regulatory requirements. Ticor requires not
only that a state agency be authorized to supervise; the agency must also
actually supervise. Clearly, the Ticor requirements are not fulfilled on paper
alone, and a court may look beyond the written word to a state's actual
regulatory activities. Any such review of South Carolina's scheme could
prove fatal.
S.C. Code section 44-7-560 defines the economic benefits that could result
from a cooperative health care arrangement.59 Admittedly, these are worthy
objectives. However, the data that participants are required to provide to
DHEC could not possibly provide a sufficient basis on which to determine
whether in fact such benefits are achieved. The Regulations are nonspecific
as to the economic market data required and, in fact, anticipate that applicants
themselves will perform the economic analysis. The applicant is thus directed
to "[d]emonstrate and document that the likely benefits accruing from the
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. S.C. CODE REGS. 61-31 § 502 (Supp. 1995).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., S.C. CODE REGS. 61-31 §§ 501-503 (Supp. 1995).
59. These include, for instance, "gains in the cost efficiency of. . .services," "avoidance or
elimination or reduction of duplication of health care resources," and "preservation of health care
providers close to communities." S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-560 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
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cooperative agreement outweigh the likely disadvantages." Rather than DHEC
assuming responsibility to determe "how the cooperative agreement will
reduce competition, reduce patient choice, or otherwise negatively impact the
health care system" 6' based on economic data collected by the Department,
the applicant performs the critical task. Because the applicant defines the
problem, describes a solution, and submits only the data that support the
solution, there may be no basis on which DHEC could possibly undertake a
de novo review.61
The regulatory preference for analysis by confession may be explained by
the lack of a budget and personnel to implement the review required by the
Health Care Cooperation Act and Regulation 61-31. It is indeed amazing that
Leon Frishman was able to produce the high-quality Regulation 61-31. During
the Eighth Annual Health Care Law Seminar, 2 he indicated that DHEC
enforcement staff was nonexistent, and that any enforcement will be funded
only by filing fees. Although filing fees are significant,63 they cannot fund
a nonexistent staff. Unless a DHEC enforcement staff is funded and active,
there is little chance that the Health Care Cooperation Act will provide the
immunity that the Legislature intended to create.
V. NONREGULATED ACTIVITIES
Even if the legislature were to fund the program and DHEC were to
provide sufficient supervision, however, antitrust problems might still arise.
Providers and purchasers of health care must remain vigilant during the
prefiling stages. The Act's language is dangerous. S.C. Code section 44-7-
520(B) provides that parties negotiating a cooperative agreement will not be
subject to state antitrust laws, but makes no similar claim for the federal
antitrust laws.' The section broadly defines the General Assembly's
60. S.C. CODE REGS. 61-31 § 202 (Supp. 1995).
61. Compare the Application required by S.C. CODE REGS. 61-31 § 202 (Supp. 1995), for
instance, to that required by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in
connection with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act premerger notification. In
the latter, the applicants are required to provide extensive raw data as to sales, markets, and the
like. The economic impact analysis is left to the economists at the FTC or the DOJ. By
contrast, under the South Carolina scheme, the applicants are asked to function as DHEC's
economists. It seems dangerous indeed to assume that one seeking a Certificate of Public
Advantage will undertake a review of the competitive situation designed to protect state interests,
rather than the individual's interests. The admonition of the Court in Ticor that the agency must
have "exercised sufficient judgment and control" must be recalled. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.
Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2177 (1992). State agency dependence upon a participant-who is
presumed to be acting in her own interests-may not constitute "sufficientjudgment and control."
See Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
62. September 22, 1995.
63. Regulation 61-31 § 509 prescribes initial filing fees of $3,000 per party (maximum
$15,000 per application) and monitoring fees of $5,000 or $7,000 depending on the number of
participants. S.C. CODE REGS. 61-31 § 509 (Supp. 1995).
64. Section 44-7-520(B) reads in part: "A health care provider, health provider network, or
health care purchaser may negotiate, enter into, and conduct business pursuant to a cooperative
agreement without being subject to damages, liability, or scrutiny under any state antitrust law.
[Vol. 47:615
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss3/7
HEALTH CARE COOPERATION ACT
intention that the Act immunize "covered activities" from federal antitrust
challenge, which may create a mistaken sense of security at the prefiling
state.' Early negotiations cannot be shielded from federal antitrust challenge
because the state is not actively evaluating, monitoring, and participating in
those potentially anticompetitive activities. The active state supervision
required by Ticor and directed in the Act is not evident in the period prior to
filing an application; thus there can be no state action immunity for these
activities. In addition, the protection offered against state antitrust laws
applies only if the parties actually apply for a Certificate of Public Advantage.
If the negotiations fail to result in an application, the parties remain subject to
both state and federal antitrust laws.
Meetings and negotiations among competitors are among the riskiest
activities under the antitrust laws.' To the extent that the Act appears to
shield these activities from antitrust scrutiny, it is particularly misleading.
Health care competitors should continue to enter into negotiations or
discussions to achieve the benefits cooperation can engender. However,
agendas that steer clear of forbidden issues should be rigidly followed, and
antitrust counsel should be involved. Health care providers would be wise not
to depend at all on the protection ostensibly offered in section 44-7-520(B).
VI. CONCLUSION
If adequately funded and enthusiastically administered, the Health Care
Cooperation Act will provide immunity from antitrust statutes. However,
health care industry participants can and should undertake measures to
minimize potential antitrust danger: (1) During initial negotiations, assume
that all antitrust laws apply; consult with and involve antitrust counsel in these
activities. (2) Encourage DHEC to exercise affirmatively the authority
provided by the Act and Regulations; do not accept or act upon a "negative
option" approval. (3) Conduct business cautiously until DHEC has issued a
Certificate of Public Advantage, perhaps following "hold separate" conduct
until that time. (4) Provide DHEC with complete information to allow it to
actively monitor the activities undertaken under the Certificate. (5) Encourage
adequate funding by the legislature.
It seems antithetical to encourage state involvement in industry activity.
And unless the contemplated activity poses an antitrust risk, the usual efforts
to avoid attracting regulatory attention may still be the best approach.
However, to escape the potentially lethal embrace of the antitrust laws, the
Health Care Cooperation Act must be fully implemented and actively enforced.
In addition, conduct in negotiating and entering into a cooperative agreement for which an
application for a Certificate of Public Advantage is filed in good faith is inunue from challenge
or scrutiny under state antitrust laws . . " S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-520(B) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1995).
65. "It is the intention of the General Assembly that this article immunizes covered activities"
from the federal antitrust laws. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-520(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
66. See, e.g., United States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114, 1122 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that an agreement in restraint of trade is not necessary for a violation of the federal
antitrust laws; mere verbal attempts to monopolize are sufficient).
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If this is done, state action immunity can provide some of the predictability
providers are seeking in the dynamic, changing health care industry.
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